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Abstract—COVID-19 is a global epidemic. Till now, there is no
remedy for this epidemic. However, isolation and social distancing
are seemed to be effective preventive measures to control this
pandemic. Therefore, in this paper, an optimization problem is
formulated that accommodates both isolation and social distanc-
ing features of the individuals. To promote social distancing,
we solve the formulated problem by applying a noncooperative
game that can provide an incentive for maintaining social
distancing to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Furthermore, the
sustainability of the lockdown policy is interpreted with the help
of our proposed game-theoretic incentive model for maintaining
social distancing where there exists a Nash equilibrium. Finally,
we perform an extensive numerical analysis that shows the
effectiveness of the proposed approach in terms of achieving the
desired social-distancing to prevent the outbreak of the COVID-
19 in a noncooperative environment. Numerical results show
that the individual incentive increases more than 85% with an
increasing percentage of home isolation from 25% to 100% for
all considered scenarios. The numerical results also demonstrate
that in a particular percentage of home isolation, the individual
incentive decreases with an increasing number of individuals.
Index Terms—COVID-19, health economics, isolation, social
distancing, noncooperative game, nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV or COVID-19) is con-
sidered to be one of the most dangerous pandemics of this
century. COVID-19 has already affected every aspect of in-
dividual’s life i.e. politics, sovereignty, economy, education,
religion, entertainment, sports, tourism, transportation, and
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manufacturing. It was first identified in Wuhan City, China on
December 29, 2019, and within a short span of time, it spread
out worldwide [1], [2]. The World Health Organization (WHO)
has announced the COVID-19 outbreak as a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and identified
it as an epidemic on January 30, 2020 [3]. Till July 23,
2020, COVID-19 has affected 215 countries and territories
throughout the globe and 2 international conveyances [4].
The recent statistics on COVID-19 also indicate that more
than 15, 371, 829 persons have been affected in different ways
[4], [5]. Currently, the ten most infected countries are USA,
Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa, Peru, Mexico, Chile,
Spain, and UK, where affected people of these countries more
than 68% of the worldwide cases. Since the outbreak, the
total number of human death and recovery to/from COVID-
19 are 630, 138 and 9, 348, 761, respectively [4], [5] (till July
23, 2020). The fatality of human life due to COVID-19 is
frightening in numerous countries. For instance, among the
highest mortality rates countries, 70% of the mortality belongs
to the top 8 countries due to COVID-19. Furthermore, the
percentages of affected cases for male and female are around
55.21% and 44.79%, whereas these values are about 76%
and 24%, respectively in death cases globally [6]. Different
countries are undertaking different initiatives to reduce the
impact of the COVID-19 epidemic, but there is no clear-cut
solution to date.
One of the most crucial tasks that countries need to do
for understanding and controlling the spread of COVID-19 is
testing. Testing allows infected bodies to acknowledge that
they are already affected. This can be helpful for taking care
of them, and also to decrease the possibility of contaminating
others. In addition, testing is also essential for a proper
response to the pandemic. It allows carrying evidence-based
steps to slow down the spread of COVID-19. However, to date,
the testing capability for COVID-19 is quite inadequate in
most countries around the world. South Korea was the second
COVID-19 infectious country after China during February
2020. However, mass testing may be one of the reasons why it
succeeded to diminish the number of new infections in the first
wave of the outbreak since it facilitates a rapid identification
of potential outbreaks [7]. For detecting COVID-19, two kinds
of tests are clinically carried out: (i) detection of virus particles
in swabs collected from the mouth or nose, and (ii) estimating
the antibody response to the virus in blood serum.
This COVID-19 epidemic is still uncontrolled in most
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countries. As a result, day by day, the infected cases and
death graph are rising exponentially. However, researchers are
also focusing on the learning-based mechanism for detecting
COVID-19 infections [8]–[14]. This approach can be cost-
effective and also possibly will take less time to perform the
test. Meanwhile, other studies [15]–[20] focus on analyzing the
epidemiological and/or clinical characteristics of COVID-19.
However, the infected cases of the COVID-19 can be reduced
by maintaining a certain social distance among the people.
In particular, to maintain such social distancing, self-isolation,
and community lockdown can be possible approaches. Thus, it
is imperative to develop a model so that the social community
can take a certain decision for self-isolation/lockdown to
prevent the spread of COVID-19.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that focuses
on the mathematical model for monitoring and controlling
individual in a community setting to prevent this COVID-
19 epidemic. Thus, the main contribution of this paper is
to develop an effective mathematical model with the help of
global positioning system (GPS) information to fight against
COVID-19 epidemic by monitoring and controlling individual.
To this end, we make the following key contributions:
• First, we formulate an optimization problem for maxi-
mizing the social utility of individual considering both
isolation and social distancing. Here, the optimization
parameters are the positions of individual.
• Second, we reformulate the objective function which
is incorporated with the social distancing feature of an
individual as a noncooperative game. Here, we show that
home isolation is the dominant strategy for all the players
of the game. We also prove that the game has a Nash
Equilibrium (NE).
• Third, we interpret the sustainability of lockdown policy
with the help of our model.
• Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
approach with the help of extensive numerical analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present the literature review. We explain the system
model and present the problem formulation in Section III. The
proposed solution approach of the above-mentioned problem
is addressed in Section IV. We interpret the sustainability of
lockdown policy with our model in Section V. In Section
VI, we provide numerical analysis for the proposed approach.
Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section VII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
COVID-19 is the seventh coronavirus identified to contami-
nate humans. Individuals were first affected by the 2019-nCoV
virus from bats and other animals that were sold at the seafood
market in Wuhan [21], [22]. Afterward, it began to spread from
human to human mainly through respiratory droplets produced
while people sneeze cough or exhaling [3]. Epidemiological
and/or clinical characteristics of COVID-19 are analyzed in
the studies [15]–[20].
In [15], the authors investigate the epidemiologic and clini-
cal characteristics based on 91 cases of COVID-19 patients
of Zhejiang, China. Among these samples, 96.70% were
laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 tested positive for SARS-
Cov-2 while 3.30% were clinical-diagnosed COVID-19 cases.
The average age of the patients was 50 while females
accounted for 59.34%. The typical indications were fever
(71.43%), cough (60.44%) and fatigue (43.96%). 43.96%o
these patients were affected from local cases, 34.07% went to
or were in Wuhan/Hubei, 8.79% came in contact with peoples
from Wuhan, and 12.09% were from aircraft transmission.
The authors represent a detailed statistical analysis of 1, 212
individuals collected from January 21 to February 14, 2020,
and covering 18 regions of the Henan province, China [16].
Among these cases, 55% were male and ages of these patients
were from 21 to 60 years. Among these patients, 20.63%
had Wuhan’s travel history. In [17], the authors investigate
epidemiological, demographic, clinical, and radiological fea-
tures and laboratory data for 99 cases of 2019-nCoV collected
from Jinyintan Hospital, Wuhan, China. They found that 49%
of these patients traveled to the Huanan seafood market. The
average age of the victims was 55.5 years, and most of them
(67.68%) were men. The main clinical manifestations were
fever (83%), cough (82%), shortness of breath (31%). Among
the sufferers, 75% exhibited bilateral pneumonia also. The
work in [18] analyzes the clinical characteristics of 1,099
patients with laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV ARD from 552
hospitals in 31 provinces/provincial municipalities of Wuhan,
China. This work concluded that the median age of these
patients was 47 years where 41.90% of them were female.
The most common symptoms of these patients were fever
(87.9%) and cough (67.7%). Most of these cases had a Wuhan
connection (31.30% had been to Wuhan, and 71.80% had
contacted people from Wuhan). Epidemiological investigations
were conducted in [19] among all close contacts of COVID-19
patients (or suspected patients) in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province,
China. Among them, 33.3% recently traveled Hubei and the
average age of these cases was 32.5 years including 33.3%
male. 20.8% of these patients showed fever, cough, fatigue
symptoms during hospitalization whereas 50.0% cases showed
typical CT images of the ground-glass chest and 20.8%
presented stripe shadowing in the lungs. The study in [20]
estimates the clinical features of COVID-19 in pregnancy and
the intrauterine vertical transmission potential of COVID-19
infection. The age range of the subjects was 26–40 years
and everybody of them had laboratory-confirmed COVID-
19 pneumonia. They showed a similar pattern of clinical
characteristics to non-pregnant adult patients. The authors
mainly found that no intrauterine fetal infections occurred as a
result of COVID-19 infection during a late stage of pregnancy.
Machine learning can play an important role to detect
COVID-19 infected people based on the observatory data. The
work in [8] proposes an algorithm to investigate the readings
from the smartphone’s sensors to find the COVID 19 symp-
toms of a patient. Some commons symptoms of COVID-19
victims like fever, fatigue, headache, nausea, dry cough, lung
CT imaging features, and shortness of breath can be captured
by using the smartphone. This detection approach for COVID-
19 is faster than the clinical diagnosis methods. The authors
in [9] propose an artificial intelligence (AI) framework for ob-
taining the travel history of people using a phone-based survey
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to classify them as no-risk, minimal-risk, moderate-risk, and
high-risk of being affected with COVID-19. The model needs
to be trained with the COVID-19 infected information of the
areas where s/he visited to accurately predict the risk level of
COVID-19. In [10], the authors develop a deep learning-based
method (COVNet) to identify COVID -19 from the volumetric
chest CT image. For measuring the accuracy of their system,
they utilize community-acquired pneumonia (CAP) and other
non-pneumonia CT images. The authors in [11] also use deep
learning techniques for distinguishing COVID-19 pneumonia
from Influenza-A viral pneumonia and healthy cases based
on the pulmonary CT images. They use a location-attention
classification model to categorize the images into the above
three groups. Depth cameras and deep learning are applied to
recognize unusual respiratory pattern of personnel remotely
and accurately in [12]. They propose a novel and effective
respiratory simulation model based on the characteristics of
original respiratory signals. This model intends to fill the
gap between large training datasets and infrequent real-world
data. Multiple retrospective experiments were demonstrated
to examine the performance of the system in the detection
of speculated COVID-19 thoracic CT characteristics in [13].
A 3D volume review, namely "Corona score" is employed
to assess the evolution of the disease in each victim over
time. In [14], the authors use a pre-trained UNet to fragment
the lung region for automatic detection of COVID-19 from
a chest CT image. Afterward, they use a 3D deep neural
network to estimate the probability of COVID-19 infections
over the segmented 3D lung region. Their algorithm uses 499
CT volumes as a training dataset and 131 CT volumes as
a test dataset and achieves 0.959 ROC AUC and 0.976 PR
AUC. The study in [23] presents evidence of the diversity
of human coronavirus, the rapid evolution of COVID-19, and
their clinical and Epidemiological characteristics. The authors
also develop a deep learning model for identifying COVID-
19. and trained the model using a small CT image datasets.
They find an accuracy of around 90% using a small CT image
dataset.
In [24], the authors propose a stochastic transmission model
for capturing the phenomenon of the COVID-19 outbreak
by applying a new model to quantify the effectiveness of
association tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)-like
pathogen. In their model, they analyze synopses with a varying
number of initial cases, the basic reproduction number, the
delay from symptom onset to isolation, the probability that
contacts were traced, the proportion of transmission that oc-
curred before symptom start, and the proportion of subclinical
infections. They find that contact tracing and case isolation
are capable enough to restrain a new outbreak of COVID-19
within 3 months. In [25], the authors present a risk-sensitive
social distance recommendation system to ensure private
safety from COVID-19. They formulate a social distance rec-
ommendation problem by characterizing Conditional Value-at-
Risk (CVaR) for a personal area network (PAN) via Bluetooth
beacon. They solve the formulated problem by proposing a two
phases algorithm based on a linear normal model. In [26], the
authors mainly dissect the various technological interventions
Market
Educational 
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Home
Home
Home
Figure 1: Exemplary System model. Isolation indicates staying
at home whereas social distancing measures the distance of a
individual from others.
made in the direction of COVID-19 impact management.
Primarily, they focus on the use of emerging technologies such
as Internet of Things (IoT), drones, artificial intelligence (AI),
blockchain, and 5G in mitigating the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic.
The works [8]–[20], [23]–[26] focused on COVID-19 detec-
tion and analyzed the characteristic of its respiratory pattern.
Hence, the literature has achieved a significant result in terms
of post responses. In fact, it is also imperative to control
the epidemic of COVID-19 by maintaining social distance.
Therefore, different from the existing literature, we focus on
the design of a model that can measure individual’s isolation
and social distance to prevent the epidemic of COVID-19. The
model considers both isolation and social distancing features
of individuals to control the outbreak of COVID-19.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an area in which a set N of N individuals are
living under COVID-19 threat and must decide whether to
stay at home or go leave their homes to visit a market,
shop, train station, or other locations, as shown in Figure 1.
Everyone has a mobile phone with GPS. From analyzing the
GPS information, we can know their home locations of each
individuals, and longitude and latitude of these locations are
denoted by Xh , and Yh , respectively. We consider one time
period (e.g., 15 or 30 minutes) for our scenario and this time
period is divided into T smaller time steps in a set T . For
each of time step t ∈ T , we have the GPS coordinates X and
Y of every individual.
Now, the deviation from home for any individual i ∈ N in
between two time steps can be measured by using Euclidean
distance as follows:
δti =

√
(Xhi − X ti )2 + (Yhi − Y ti )2, if t = 1,√
(X t−1i − X ti )2 + (Y t−1i − Y ti )2, otherwise.
(1)
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Thus, the total deviation from home by each individual i ∈ N
in a particular time period can be calculated as follows:
δi =
∑
t∈T
δti , ∀i ∈ N (2)
On the other hand, at the end of a particular time period, the
distance between an individual i ∈ N and any other individuals
j ∈ N, j , i is as follows:
d ji =
√
(XTi − XTj )2 + (YTi − YTj )2. (3)
Hence, the total distance of individual i ∈ N from other
individuals Ni ⊆ N , who are in close proximity with i ∈ N ,
can be expressed as follows:
di =
∑
j∈Ni
d ji , ∀i ∈ N . (4)
Our objective is to keep δ minimum for reducing the
spread of COVID-19 from infected individuals, which is an
isolation strategy. Meanwhile, we want to maximize social
distancing which mathematically translates into maximizing d
for reducing the chance of infection from others. However,
we can use log term to bring fairness [27], [28] in the
objective function among all individuals. Hence, we can pose
the following optimization problem:
max
X,Y
ω
∑
i∈N
log(Z − δi) + (1 − ω)
∑
i∈N
log di (5)
s.t. δi ≤ δmax, (5a)
d ji ≥ dmin, ∀i, j (5b)
ω ∈ [0, 1]. (5c)
In (5), Z is a large number for changing the minimiza-
tion problem to maximization one, and Z > δi, ∀i ∈ N .
The optimization variables X and Y indicate longitude, and
latitude, respectively, of the individuals. Moreover, the first
term in (5) encourages individual for isolation whereas the
second term in (5) encourages individual to maintain fair
social distancing. In this way, solving (5) can play a vital
role in our understanding on how to control the spread of
COVID-19 among vast population in the society. Constraint
(5a) guarantees small deviation to maintain emergency needs,
while Constraint (5b) assures a minimum fair distance among
all the individuals to reduce the spreading of COVID-19 from
one individual to another. Constraint (5c) shows that ω can
take any value between 0 and 1 which captures the importance
between two key factors captured in the objective function of
(5). For example, if COVID-19 is already spreading in a given
society, then most of the weight would go to isolation term
rather than social distancing. The objective of (5) is difficult
to achieve as it requires the involvement and coordination
among all the N individual. Moreover, if the individuals are not
convinced then it is also difficult for the government to attain
the objective forcefully. Thus, we need an alternative solution
approach that encourage individual separately to achieve the
objective and game theory, which is successfully used in [29],
[30], can be one potential solution, which will be elaborated
in the next section.
IV. A NONCOOPERATIVE GAME SOLUTION
To attain the objective for a vast population, governments
can introduce incentives for isolation and also for social
distancing. Then every individual wants to maximize their
utilities or payoffs. In this way, government can play its role
for achieving social objective. Hence, the modified objective
function is given as follows:
U(δ, d) = α
∑
i∈N
log(Z − δi) + β
∑
i∈N
log di, (6)
where α = α
′
ω and β = β
′(1 − ω) with α′ > 0 and β′ > 0
are incentives per unit of isolation and social distancing.
In practice, α and β can be monetary values for per unit
of isolation and social distancing, respectively. In (6), one
individual’s position affects the social distancing of others, and
hence, the individuals have partially conflicting interest on the
outcome of U. Therefore, the situation can be interpreted with
the noncooperative game [31], [32].
A noncooperative game is a game that exhibit a competitive
situation where each player needs to make choices independent
of the other players, given the possible policies of the other
players and their impact on the player’s payoffs or utilities.
Now, a noncooperative game in strategic form or a strategic
game G is a triplet G = (N, (Si)i∈N, (ui)i∈N) [35] for any time
period where:
• N is a finite set of players, i.e., N = {1, 2, · · · , N},
• Si is the set of available strategies for player i ∈ N ,
• ui : S → R is the payoff function of player i ∈ N , with
S = S1 × S2 × .. × SN .
In our case Si = {shi , smi } where shi and smi indicate the
strategies of staying at home and moving outside for player
i ∈ N , respectively. The payoff or incentive function of any
player i ∈ N in a time period can be defined as follows:
ui(.) =
{
α log Z + β log d˜i, if strategy is shi ,
α log(Z − δi) + β log di, if strategy is smi .
(7)
where d˜i =
∑
j∈Ni
√
(Xhi − Xj)2 + (Yhi − Yj)2.
The Nash equilibrium [33] is the most used solution concept
for a noncooperative game. Formally, Nash equilibrium can be
defined as follows [34]:
Definition 1. : A pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a non-
cooperative game G = (N, (Si)i∈N, (ui)i∈N) is a strategy
profile s∗ ∈ S where ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ N .
However, to find the Nash equilibrium, the following two
definitions can be helpful.
Definition 2. [35]: A strategy si ∈ Si is the dominant strategy
for player i ∈ N if ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i), ∀s
′
i ∈ S and ∀s−i ∈S−i , where S−i = ∏j∈N, j,i Sj is the set of all strategy profiles
for all players except i.
Definition 3. [35]: A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is the dominant
strategy equilibrium if every elements s∗i of s∗ is the dominant
strategy of player i ∈ N .
Thus, if we can show that every player of our game G has
a strategy that gives better utility irrespective of other players
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Table I: Game matrix for 2-players
P 2
sh2 s
m
2
P 1 s
h
1 (u1(sh1 , sh2 ), u2(sh1 , sh2 )) (u1(sh1 , sm2 ), u2(sh1 , sm2 ))
sm1 (u1(sm1 , sh2 ), u2(sm1 , sh2 )) (u1(sm1 , sm2 ), u2(sm1 , sm2 ))
strategies, then with the help of Definition 2 and 3, we can
say that Proposition 1 is true.
Proposition 1. G has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when
α > β.
Proof. Let us consider a 2-player simple matrix game as
shown in Table I with the mentioned strategies. For simplicity,
we consider a distance Laplacian distance ∆ that each player
can pass in any timestamp.
Thus, the utilities of P1:
u1(sh1 , sh2 ) = α log Z + β log d1,
u1(sh1 , sm2 ) = α log Z + β log(d1 ± ∆),
u1(sm1 , sh2 ) = α log(Z − ∆) + β log(d1 ± ∆),
u1(sm1 , sm2 ) = α log(Z − ∆) + β log(d1 ± 2∆),
(8)
where ± indicates the movement of player to other player and
opposite direction, respectively. Now,
u1(sh1 , sh2 ) − u1(sm1 , sh2 ) =
α log
(
Z
Z − ∆
)
+ β log
(
d1
d1 ± ∆
)
,
u1(sh1 , sm2 ) − u1(sm1 , sm2 ) =
α log
(
Z
Z − ∆
)
+ β log
(
d1 ± ∆
d1 ± 2∆
)
,
(9)
As α > β, so the following conditions hold from (9):
u1(sh1 , sh2 ) − u1(sm1 , sh2 ) ≥ 0,
u1(sh1 , sm2 ) − u1(sm1 , sm2 ) ≥ 0,
(10)
Hence, rewriting (10), we get the followings:
u1(sh1 , sh2 ) ≥ u1(sm1 , sh2 ),
u1(sh1 , sm2 ) ≥ u1(sm1 , sm2 ).
(11)
Hence, sh1 is the dominant strategy of P1. Moreover, for the
player P2, the utilities are as follows:
u2(sh1 , sh2 ) = α log Z + β log d2,
u2(sm1 , sh2 ) = α log Z + β log(d2 ± ∆),
u2(sh1 , sm2 ) = α log(Z − ∆) + β log(d2 ± ∆),
u2(sm1 , sm2 ) = α log(Z − ∆) + β log(d2 ± 2∆),
(12)
Now,
u2(sh1 , sh2 ) − u2(sh1 , sm2 ) =
α log
(
Z
Z − ∆
)
+ β log
(
d2
d2 ± ∆
)
,
u2(sm1 , sh2 ) − u2(sm1 , sm2 ) =
α log
(
Z
Z − ∆
)
+ β log
(
d2 ± ∆
d2 ± 2∆
)
,
(13)
As α > β, so the following conditions hold from (13):
u2(sh1 , sh2 ) − u2(sm1 , sm2 ) ≥ 0,
u2(sm1 , sh2 ) − u2(sm1 , sm2 ) ≥ 0,
(14)
Hence, rewriting (14), we get the followings:
u2(sh1 , sh2 ) ≥ u2(sh1 , sm2 ),
u2(sm1 , sh2 ) ≥ u2(sm1 , sm2 ).
(15)
Hence, sh2 is the dominant strategy of player P2.
When there are N-players (N > 2) in the game, incentive
of player i ∈ N (takes strategy shi , without considering others
strategy), is given as follows:
ui(shi , . . . ) = α log Z + β log d˜i . (16)
However, if the player i ∈ N takes the strategy smi , i.e.,
the player visits some crowded place like market, shop, train
station, school, or other location, then a person may come in
close contact with many others. Thus, the incentive of player
i ∈ N with this strategy is given as follows:
ui(smi , . . . ) = α log(Z − δi) + β log di, (17)
where δi is calculated from (2) and di is measured from
(4) for that particular location. Moreover, di < d˜i as these
places are crowded and individuals are in short distance with
one another. Hence, ui(shi , . . . ) > ui(smi , . . . ) as Z > Z − δi
and d˜i > di for any player i ∈ N . That means, shi is
the dominant strategy for player i ∈ N irrespective of the
strategies of other players in the game G. Thus, there is a
strategy profile s∗ = {sh1 , sh2 , · · · , shN } ∈ S where each element
s∗i is a dominant strategy. Hence, by Definition 3, s
∗ is a
dominant strategy equilibrium. Moreover, a dominant strategy
equilibrium is always a Nash equilibrium [35]. Hence, the
game G has always a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Thus, Nash equilibrium is the solution of the noncooperative
game G. In this equilibrium, no player of N has the benefit of
changing their strategy while others remain in their strategies.
That means, the utility of each player i ∈ S is maximized
in this strategy, and hence ultimately maximize the utility
of (6). In fact, incentivizing the social distancing mechanism
is promoting social distancing to each individual. To this
end, maximizing U of (6) ultimately maximize the original
objective function of (5).
Moreover, the Nash equilibrium point has a greater implica-
tion on controlling the spread of COVID-19 in the society. At
the NE point, every individual stays at home. So, if someone
gets affected by COVID-19, the individual will not go in
contact with others. Similarly, an unaffected individual has no
probability to come in contact with an affected individuals.
Unfortunately, the family members have the chance to be
affected if they don’t follow fair distance and health norms.
V. SUSTAINABILITY OF LOCKDOWN POLICY WITH THE
SYSTEM MODEL
The sustainability of the lockdown policy can be interpreted
by using the outcome of the Nash equilibrium point that is
achieved in the noncooperative game in Section IV.
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The total amount of incentive a particular time period is
presented in (6). In a particular day, we have Ts = 24×60T0 time
period where T0 is the length of a time period in minutes.
Thus, we can denote the incentive of a time stamp ts in a
particular day p as follows:
Utsp (δ, d) = α
∑
i∈N
log(Z − δi) + β
∑
i∈N
log di . (18)
Hence, the amount of resources/money that is necessary to
incentivize peoples in a particular day, p can be expressed as
follows:
Up =
Ts∑
ts=1
Utsp (δ, d). (19)
Now, if we are interested to find the sustainability of
lockdown policy for a particular country till a certain number
of days, denoted by P, we have to satisfy the following
inequality:
P∑
p=1
Up ≤ R0 +
P∑
p=1
rp, (20)
where R0 is the amount of resource/money of a particular
country at the starting of lockdown policy that can be used
as incentive and rp is the collected resources in a particular
day, p, of the lockdown period. Here, rp includes governmental
revenue and donation from different individuals, organizations
and even countries. Moreover, the unit of α, β, R0 and rp are
same.
If we assume for simplicity that Up and rp are same for
every day and they are denoted by U˜ and r˜ , respectively, then
we can rewrite (20) as follows:
P × U˜ ≤ R0 + P × r˜ . (21)
Hence, if we are interested to find the upper limit of sustain-
able days for a particular country using lockdown policy, then
we have the following equality:
P × U˜ = R0 + P × r˜ . (22)
Thus, by simplifying (22), we have the following:
P =
R0
U˜ − r˜ . (23)
Here, the sustainable days P depends on R0, U˜, and r˜ .
However, we cannot change R0 but government can predict r˜ .
Moreover, depending on R0 and r˜ , government can formulate
its policy to set α and β so that individuals are encour-
aged to follow the lockdown policy. Alongside, we cannot
continue lockdown policy infinitely based upon the limited
total resources. Hence, the governments should formulate and
update its lockdown policy based on the predicted sustainable
capability to handle COVID-19, otherwise resource crisis will
be a further bigger worldwide pandemic.
VI. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we assess the proposed approach using
numerical analyses. We consider an area of 1, 000 m × 1, 000
m for our analysis where individuals’ position are randomly
Table II: Value of the principal simulation parameters
Symbol Value
N {500, 1000, 1500, 2000}
α 3.0
β 1.0
ω [0, 1]
Z 1400
R0 {5E + 23, 5.5E + 23, 6E + 23, 6.5E + 23, 7E + 23}
r˜ {U˜ ∗ 0.10, U˜ ∗ 0.20, U˜ ∗ 0.30, U˜ ∗ 0.40, U˜ ∗ 0.50}
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Value of 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
To
ta
l i
nc
en
tiv
e
104
 N=500(100% home quarantine)
 N=500(100% Random location)
 N=1000(100% home quarantine)
 N=1000(100% Random location)
Figure 2: Comparison of incentive (in log scale) for varying
value of ω.
distributed. The value of the principal simulation parameters
are shown in the Table II.
Figure 2 illustrates a comparison between home isolation
(stay at home) and random location in the considered area for
a varying value of ω. In this figure, we consider two cases of
N = 500 and N = 1, 000. In both the cases, home isolation
(quarantine) is beneficial over staying in random location and
the differences between two approaches are increased with
the increasing value of ω. Moreover, the difference of payoffs
between two approaches are increased with the increasing
value of ω as the more importance are given in home isolation.
Figure 3 shows the empirical cumulative distribution func-
tion (ecdf) of incentives for different numbers of individuals.
The figure revels that the incentive values increase with the
increasing number of home quarantine individuals in all the
four cases. Figure 3a exhibits that the incentives are below
19, 000, and 20, 000 for 50%, and 48% sure, respectively, for
25% and 50% home quarantine cases whereas the incentives
are 90% sure in between 20, 500 and 21, 000 for 75% home
isolation case. Further, the same values are at least 21, 500 for
50% sure in case of full home isolation. Figure 3b depicts
that the incentive of being below 38, 000 is 40% sure for
25% home isolation case, however, the same values of being
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Total incentive 104
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(c) N = 1, 500
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(d) N = 2, 000
Figure 3: Ecdf of incentives (in log scale) for different value
of N with α = 3.0 and β = 1.0 using 50 runs.
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Figure 4: Total incentive (average of 50 runs) for varying
percentage of home isolation individuals when α = 3.0 and
β = 1.0.
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Figure 5: Average individual incentive for varying percentage
of home quarantine individuals when α = 3.0 and β = 1.0.
above 40, 000, and 41, 000 are 40%, and 60%, sure, respective,
for 50%, and 75% cases. Moreover, for 100% home isolation
case, the values are in between 42, 000 to 43, 000 for sure. The
incentives for 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% home isolation cases
are above 57, 000, 59, 000, 61, 000, and 63, 000, respectively,
with probability 0.60, 0.65, 0.65, and 0.80, respectively, as
shown in Figure 3c. Additionally, the same values are at least
77, 000, 79, 000, 81, 000, and 83, 500 with 0.50, 0.50, 0.72, and
1.00 probabilities, respectively, which is presented in Figure
3d.
The total incentive (averaging of 50 runs) for varying
percentage of home isolation individuals with different sample
size are shown in Figure 4. From this figure, we observe that
the total payoff increases with increasing number of home iso-
lation individuals for all considered cases. The incentives are
578%, 571%, 571%, and 571% better from home quarantine
of 25% to 100% for N = 500, N = 1, 000, N = 1, 500, and
N = 2, 000, respectively. Moreover, for a particular percentage
of home isolation, the total incentive is related with the sample
size. In case of 50% individuals in the home isolation, the
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Figure 6: Maximum possible lockdown period with varying
number of individuals when R0 = 5E + 23, r˜ = U˜ ∗ 0.10, and
using total incentive shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 7: Maximum possible lockdown period with varying
R0 and r˜ with total payoff shown in Figure 4.
incentive for N = 2, 000 is 97.08%, 42.50%, and 15.96% more
than that of N = 500, N = 1, 000, and N = 1, 500, respectively.
Figure 5 shows the average individual payoff for varying
parentage of home isolation individuals for different scenarios.
The figure exhibits that the average individual incentive in-
creases with an increasing percentage of home isolation as the
deviation δ decreases and hence, the value of home isolation
incentive increases. For N = 500, the incentive of 100% home
isolation is 85.25% more than that of 25% home isolation.
Moreover, in a particular percentage of home isolation, the
incentive decreases with an increasing number of considered
individuals as the social distancing decreases due to the more
number of individuals. In case of 50% home isolation, the
individual incentive for N = 500 is 102.96% more than that
of N = 2, 000.
Figure 6 shows the maximum possible lockdown period
for a varying number of individuals within a fixed amount
of resource R0. The figure reveals that with the increasing
percentage of home isolation individuals, the maximum lock-
down period significantly decreases for all considered cases.
The reason behind this is that the more individuals are in home
isolation, the more it is necessary to pay the incentives. With a
fixed amount of resources, a country with less individuals can
survive a longer lockdown period. With more percentages of
home isolation individuals, the number of loackdown period
is less, and possible of spreading of COVID-19 is also less.
Therefore, the governments can consider a trade-off between
increasing expenditure as a incentive and lockdown period.
For 1, 000 individuals, the maximum possible lockdown period
for varying amount of R0 and r˜ is presented in Figure 7.
The figure also illustrates that with the increasing percentages
of home isolation individuals, the continuity of the lockdown
period reduces for every scenarios. However, for a particular
percentage of home isolation individuals where total number of
individuals are fixed, a country can continue higher lockdown
period who has more am amount of resources, R0. Addition-
ally, r˜ also play an important role to continue the lockdown
period.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a mathematical model for
controlling the outbreak of COVID-19 by augmenting isolation
and social distancing features of individuals. We have solved
the utility maximization problem by using a noncooperative
game. Here, we have proved that staying home (home iso-
lation) is the best strategy of every individual and there is
a Nash equilibrium of the game. By applying the proposed
model, we have also analyzed the sustainability period of a
country with a lockdown policy. Finally, we have performed a
detailed numerical analysis of the proposed model to control
the outbreak of the COVID-19. In future, we will further
study and compare with extended cases such as centralized
and different game-theoretic models. In particular, an extensive
analysis between the government-controlled spread or people
controlled spread under more diverse epidemic models.
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